

Existing International Tuna Management Organisations: Background Information For Arrangements For South Pacific Albacore Fisheries Management

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PACIFIC ISLANDS FORUM FISHERIES AGENCY

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Second Consultation On Arrangements for South Pacific Albacore Fisheries Management

INTERNAL MEETING

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# EXISTING INTERNATIONAL TUNA MANAGEMENT ORGANISATIONS: BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR ARRANGEMENTS FOR SOUTH PACIFIC ALBACORE FISHERIES MANAGEMENT

#### **INTRODUCTION**

During the 1988/89 period an estimated 60,000 to 81,000 tonnes of albacore were harvested from the South Pacific Ocean. Between 66 and 75 percent of this harvest is estimated to have been taken by fleets targeting young albacore at the surface. Although detailed catch statistics are lacking, long driftnets are believed to have accounted for between 50 and 60 percent of this catch. The catch of adult fish by longline in deeper waters is estimated to be almost 29,000 tonnes in 1988, accounting for between 35 and 50 percent of the total South Pacific albacore catch in that year.

Despite the lack of accurate catch statistics, all indications were that the rapid escalation of the driftnet catch of South Pacific albacore between 1984 and 1989 was detrimental to the long term well being of the stock. Until the commencement of the 1989/90 season there were no regulations in fisheries for South Pacific albacore apart from domestic requirements that may have applied in the country of vessel origin.

With no existing international vehicle to restrict the operation of driftnet fleets in the South Pacific, the Pacific Island nations and territories agreed to a Convention that banned both the use of long driftnets and any operations that may be construed to support this method of fishing throughout the South Pacific. This Convention was signed in Wellington, New Zealand in 1989. In addition, Parties to the Convention agreed to cooperate to implement appropriate arrangements for the longterm management of South Pacific albacore fisheries.

This together with mounting pressure from the international community led Japan, Korea and Taiwan to introduce self-imposed regulations on the size of their fleets that would driftnet for albacore in the South Pacific during the 1989/90 season. Korea's fleet was reduced to zero. However, these measures are at best temporary.

Current initiatives, spear-headed by the Pacific Island nations and territories, involve the development of appropriate arrangements for the longterm management of the South Pacific albacore fisheries. The objective of this paper is to provide background information on existing international fisheries management organisations for participants in the Second Consultation on Arrangements for the Management of South Pacific Albacore Fisheries.

## INTERNATIONAL TUNA MANAGEMENT VEHICLES

Currently there are at least seven international organisations involved with the scientific study and management of tuna fisheries. Most pre-date the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) Convention. As a result, their current mandates include historic concerns for the status of tuna resources together with current policies governing national and international rights to harvest these resources. The more established international tuna management bodies include the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) and the Indian Ocean Fishery Commission (IOFC).

In addition to a short discussion on the structure and function of these organisations and the various constraints they face in the effective execution of their mandates, this paper also considers treaties relating to national and international access to marine resources other than tuna. These treaties include the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean (INPFC), the Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (NAFO), the Indo-Pacific Fisheries Commission (IPFC), the Convention on the Conservation of Living Resources of the Southeast Atlantic (ICSEAF), the Eastern Pacific Tuna Fishing

Agreement (IPOTFA) and the Latin American Fisheries Development Organisation (OLDEPESCA).

These treaties are discussed because of similarities in fisheries operating in their respective Convention Areas with the South Pacific albacore fishery. In considering appropriate management arrangements for South Pacific albacore the problems associated with fleets of a number of countries accessing the resources within these areas, and the attempts at cooperative management of these fisheries.

The structure of these organisations generally include:

- a body responsible for management decisions;
- provisions for receipt of scientific advice to assist management considerations;
- secretariat support;
- national representation on a governing body; and
- national, regional and/or international subsidiary bodies.

The function of the organisations include:

- management of fisheries resources within the fisheries jurisdictions of
   Parties, adjacent seas and/or high seas [an area that has been subject to some change since the introduction of 200 mile fisheries zone legislation];
- settlement of disputes; and
- co-ordination of information gathering and dissemination and data collection and analysis.

Although each of the organisations discussed receive scientific advice from various sources and attempt to apply this to management, management is not only based on the analysis of biological and fishery data. A broad range of issues require consideration in international tuna management. These include economic, legal, social and political issues, the consideration of which result in six general problems for international tuna management. These problems relate to:

- collection and analysis of data useful for tuna fisheries management;
- allocation of catches among fleets or gears;
- economics and carrying capacities of the participating fleets;
- enforcement of conservation regulations;
- political interference in management considerations; and
- legislation that does not adequately cater for extended fisheries jurisdiction.

# 1. Convention between the United States of America and the Republic of Costa Rica for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC)

Established: 1949


**Contracting Parties:** France, Japan, Nicaragua, Panama, United States, Costa Rica, Vanuatu [scheduled for affiliation in 1990] {Canada, Ecuador and Mexico withdrew from the Commission in the mid-1980's}


Convention Area: Eastern Tropical Pacific

The United States and Costa Rica proposed the establishment of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) through their mutual interest in maintaining the populations of yellowfin and skipjack tuna and other species of fish taken by tuna fishing vessels in the eastern Pacific Ocean.

One to four members representing each Contracting Party or nation are appointed and financially supported by the respective governments to the Commission . Each national section has one vote in Commission proceedings and

decisions of the Commission are made by unanimous vote. Joint expenses incurred by the Commission are paid annually by each Contracting Party on the basis of the size of the catch of their fleets from the Convention Area (Appendix I).





The Commission is mandated to employ staff to assist with the execution of its responsibilities. A Director of Investigations is responsible to the Commission for the initiation, execution, administration and information dissemination to the Commission and Contracting Parties on all aspects of the biology, ecology and fisheries for tunas (skipjack and yellowfin), and other fishes taken during, or associated with, tuna fishing operations in the Convention Area. In carrying out these duties, the Commission is encouraged to collaborate with national institutions among the Contracting Parties or any other public or private source of information that would assist the Commission. In addition, Contracting Parties can establish Advisory Groups of their own.

The Commission was created in 1949 when tuna in the eastern Pacific were harvested using live bait and there was concern about the status of the targeted tuna, tuna-like species and baitfish resources.

As part of the original Convention, IATTC was provided with the authority and funds to maintain its own scientific research capability. This occurred because only one of the original signatories, the United States, had the capacity to carry out research on tunas. It was reasoned that scientific advice to the Commissioners should come from a body accountable only to them, not to individual Member nations.

In 1966, IATTC studies led to the establishment of an overall catch quota for yellowfin to be taken by all vessels of all nations operating within a specified area of the eastern Pacific known as the Commission's Yellowfin Regulatory Area (CYRA). This management regime, which operated effectively until 1978, provided a total quota on a first-come, first-serve basis. This implied that the resources belonged to whoever could catch them first.

The arrangement broke down after the developing Latin American nations, considering that their fleets were disadvantaged in a fishery which was experiencing increased participation by fleets from developed nations, broke away to form the nucleus of a new organisation, OLDEPESCA. The alternative view was that, being highly

migratory, tuna was a common property resource and that open access should apply. In the absence of any management or quota allocation, the catches and the abundance of yellowfin began to decline. The programme failed, not because of the quality of scientific advice but because Member Countries could not agree on the allocation of the resource.

In response to decreased stock availability and the effect of the El Nino on tuna catches in the eastern Pacific in 1982/83, the US tuna fleet moved from the eastern to western Pacific for a period in the late 1970's and early 1980's. In recent years the fleets have returned to the eastern Pacific, strengthening the urgency of the development of an effective management policy for this region.

#### 2. International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT)

Established: 1969

**Contracting Parties:** Angola, Benin, Brazil, Canada, Cape Verde, Cuba, France, Gabon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Japan, Korea, Morocco, Portugal, D.R. Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal [scheduled to withdraw in 1990], South Africa, Spain, USSR, USA, Uruguay, Venezuela, Guinea, with the European Community as an observer.

Convention Area: Atlantic Ocean and adjacent Seas

The International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) was established with the responsibility for scientific study of tuna, tuna-like fishes and billfish in the Atlantic Ocean. The objective of the Convention was to establish the collaborative means for ensuring populations of these fishes were maintained at levels which permit their maximum sustainable exploitation.

Each Contracting Party is represented on the Commission by not more than three delegates who may be assisted by experts and advisers. Each party has one vote in Commission decisions which are taken by majority provided a quorum of two-thirds is present for the vote. The European Community and the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations [which is the Depository for the Treaty] are entitled to observe meetings of the Commission.


A Council which meets between the annual meetings of the Commission, is responsible for the execution of functions of the Convention and other duties as assigned to it by the Commission. The Council consists of the Chairman and Vice-Chairman together with between four and eight representatives from Contracting Parties. An Executive Secretary is responsible for the administration, execution and dissemination of information and for annual reporting.

The Commission is mandated to investigate the biology, ecology, environment of, and fisheries for all species of fish of the Order Scombriformes [excluding the families Trichiuridae and Gempylidae and the genus Scomber and other species subject to investigation by other international fisheries organisations]. In carrying out these responsibilities, the Commission is expected to utilise the scientific and technical services and information available among the official agencies of the Contracting Parties including public and private sources where necessary. The Commission may also establish Panels on the basis of species, groups of species, or of geographic areas to assist with its work.

The Commission is funded from contributions from each Contracting Party. Contracting Parties participating on Panels pay additional fees and joint expenses incurred by the

Commission in excess of total membership fees are partially covered by contributions from Contracting Parties based on their catch tuna and tuna-like species (Appendix I).





The operating budget for ICCAT is currently less than US\$1 million annually. In 1986, a scale of contributions determined by application of a different formula to that described in Appendix I was proposed for ICCAT. It was suggested that for the purpose of annual contributions, Members would be grouped into three categories:

- i) industrialised countries which do not have a coastal fishing zone in the Convention Area;
- ii) developing countries which have a coastal fishing zone but not a tuna fishing industry, and
- iii) developing countries which have their fishing zone within the Convention Area and also have a tuna industry.

Although this proposal has not yet been adopted, it serves to illustrate how financial contributions to any fisheries management body require careful consideration from the time initial discussions on its establishment occur.

Except that it does not have sufficient funding and staff to conduct scientific research to attempt to provide independent advice for management, ICCAT's function is similar to IATTC's. Research is carried out by its

member countries, particularly the ones with larger fishing fleets which have greater capabilities for conducting research.

The ICCAT secretariat arranges meetings and workshops to co-ordinate and discuss the results of research and to make recommendations for management. Although efforts have been made in recent years to provide ICCAT with an independent management advisory group, the collection of basic catch and effort data and the conducting of biological studies remain the responsibility of member governments.

Much concern has been expressed by some ICCAT members over the condition of yellowfin and northern bluefin stocks and the minimum size limits set for both species in the Atlantic. Although Member nations have co-operated to limit fishing mortality to recent levels there has been no agreement on the need for quotas. The differing scientific opinions on the need for management among scientists from participating countries stem largely from the lack of adequate statistical information upon which to base management advice.

In addition to the technical problems of data collection and analysis, problems similar to those experienced in the eastern Pacific with respect to catch allocation and economics are evident in the Atlantic. Many developing coastal states adjacent to the waters in which the tuna are harvested are reluctant to agree to any conservation unless special allocations recognising their rights as developing coastal states and the relative efficiency of their fleets are agreed to. In addition, as in the Pacific, there is competition between gear types. It has proven extremely difficult to allocate the fishery resource by gear type in a management regime that is agreeable to all members.

## 3. Indian Ocean Fishery Commission (IOFC)

Established: 1967

Contracting Parties: Australia, Bahrain, Cuba, Ethiopia, France, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Crete, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Holland, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Portugal, Qatar, Sri lanka, Sweden, Tanzania, Thailand, UK, USA, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Comoros, Iran, Maldives, Mozambique, Poland, Saudia Arabia, Seychelles, Somalia, Spain, The United Arab Emirates.

# Convention Area: Indian Ocean

The Indian Ocean Fishery Commission (IOFC) was established in 1967 by the Council of the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) of the United Nations under Article VI-1 of the FAO constitution. Indian Ocean tuna management is currently the responsibility of the Committee for the Management of Indian Ocean Tuna (CMIOT) which was set up as a subsidiary body by IOFC in 1968.

The Commission has broad responsibilities over the entire field of fisheries research in the Indian Ocean and has three broad priorities: an improvement in fisheries statistics for the Indian Ocean; the management of heavily exploited stocks; and the development of international programmes in the Indian Ocean. The Commission, like IPFC, is a subsidiary body of FAO whose secretariat is provided by FAO and whose expenses are covered by the FAO Regular Programme. Commission reports and recommendations are transmitted to the Director-General of FAO who takes them into account when preparing the FAO Work Programme and Budget.


IOFC has established three Sub-regional Committees for the development and management of fisheries: i) the Gulfs, ii) the Bay of Bengal, and iii) the Southwest Indian Ocean. In their respective geographical areas, these Committees have the same functions as the Commission with respect to fisheries research, management and development which does not affect the functions entrusted by the Commission to the CMIOT.

Since the early 1980's, CMIOT has received technical support from the Indo-Pacific Tuna Programme (IPTP) which consists of a number of different projects. One of these is funded by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Indo-Pacific Tuna Development Management Programme (IPTDMP) and one is funded by the Government of Japan (Investigation of Indian Ocean and Western Pacific Small Tuna Resources). Until

1986 both these programmes were the responsibility of the same Director. Although the Committee does not have a specific budget, it is estimated that in 1986, US\$480,000 was spent in support of Committee activities.

In 1987, the UNDP-funded project was substituted for another project jointly funded by UNDP, coastal countries in the Indian Ocean, fishing nations operating in the region and the European Community (EC).

There are two main problems concerning FAO Commissions [eg. IOFC and IPFC]. The first is that non-United Nations Members cannot belong to them. The second relates to the fact that all FAO subsidiary bodies setup under Article VI-1 of the FAO constitution have only advisory functions. As a result, some of the largest tuna fishing nations operating in the regions under the jurisdiction of these Commissions do not contribute fisheries data to them or participate in management discussions. In addition, fishing nations are under no obligation to abide by the advice of the Commission.



As the total catch of tuna from the Indian Ocean approaches 700,000 tonnes annually, countries adjacent to the fisheries are investigating the possibility of developing a more effective management body for Indian Ocean fisheries, involving all fishing nations.

4. Agreement for the Establishment of the Indo-Pacific Fishery Commission (IPFC)

Established: 1948


Contracting Parties: Australia, Bangladesh, Burma, France, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New

Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, UK, USA, Vietnam, Cambodia, Nepal

#### Convention Area: Indian Ocean and Western Pacific

The Indo-Pacific Fishery Commission (IPFC) was formed in 1948 within the framework of the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), under Article XIV of the FAO constitution. The FAO provides the Secretariat for the Commission. IPFC has broad responsibility over the development and conservation of the living marine and freshwater resources of the Indo-Pacific region. The objective of the Commission is to promote the full and proper utilisation of living aquatic resources by the development and management of fishing and culture operations and the development of related processing and marketing activities.

Each Member, accompanied by advisers and experts, is represented at the sessions of the Commission by one delegate. The Commission meets once every two years to consider the Commission budget, provided through the Director General of FAO, and to discuss the findings of working groups and committees that may be established to study issues of interest to the Commission. Participation costs are the responsibility of the respective governments.



The expenses of research and development projects undertaken by individual Members of the Commission, whether independently or upon the recommendations of the Commission, are the responsibility of the respective governments.

Special ad hoc groups of experts serve the Commission to provide relevant information for management. The costs of involving these experts is borne by FAO. These groups have continually drawn attention to the lack of basic fisheries data from the fleets operating in the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific and the constraints that this places on the possibility of effective analysis to provide advice for management. Indications are that the situation is slowly improving.

## 5. The International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean (INPFC)


Established: 1978

Contracting Parties: Japan, Canada, United States

Convention Area: North Pacific and adjacent seas.

The International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean (INPFC) was established in 1978 with three Members, Japan, Canada and the United States. The Convention Area for this treaty includes the North Pacific Ocean and adjacent Seas.

Figure 5 International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean



The International North Pacific Fisheries Commission (INPFC) consists of four members from each of the three national sections of the treaty. It meets at least once annually under revolving chairmanship. A small secretariat consisting of an Executive Director, and Assistant Director and administrative assistants serve the Commission. An annual budget of joint expenses is submitted to the Contracting Parties for approval to cover the activities of the Commission in execution of its functions. The Commission does not support an independent scientific advisory group but each Contracting Party has its own National Advisory Committee.

The objectives of the Commission include:

- i) provision for cooperative scientific studies and for coordinating the collection, exchange and analysis of scientific data;
  - ii) consideration and recommendation of penalties for violations of the Convention; and
  - iii) submission of annual reports on the Commission's operations to the Contracting Parties.

Where possible, the Commission utilises the information, technical and scientific services of the official agencies of the Contracting Parties although it does have the mandate to call on outside expertise when necessary. To support

the work of the Commission, each Contracting Party has agreed to establish programmes to coordinate their scientific research for target and non-target species in the Convention Area and to regularly exchange data concerning these programmes. In addition, working groups and sub-committees serve the Commission as required.

The main concern with respect to the effective management of the fisheries resources of the North Pacific under this treaty relates to the fact that not all fishing nations operating in the North Pacific participate in the treaty.

#### 6. Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (NAFO)

Established: 1979

Contracting Parties: Bulgaria, Canada, Cuba, EC, Denmark (Faroe Islands), German Democratic Republic, Iceland, Norway, Rumania, USSR, Poland, Japan

Convention Area: Northwest Atlantic

The Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (NAFO) was established in 1979 to promote, through collaboration and cooperation, the optimum utilisation, rational management and conservation of all fishery resources of the Northwest Atlantic Ocean. Salmon, tunas and marlins, cetaceans and other stocks, the majority of which are managed by other international organisations, are not included in this treaty.

The Contracting parties to the Convention agreed to a Regulatory Area that is part of the Convention Area but which lies beyond the areas in which coastal States exercise fisheries jurisdiction. The Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (NAFO) consists of:

- i) a General Council with an elected Chairman, which is responsible for the administration and coordination of NAFO activities and liaison. Each Contracting Party has one member on the General Council who may be supported by three other staff;
- ii) a Scientific Council, consisting of one member from each Contracting Party, provides a forum for consultation and cooperation among Contracting Parties for appraisal and exchange of scientific information and fisheries data for the provision of advice to the Fisheries Commission and coastal States. The Scientific Council also advises on the location of boundaries, within the Regulatory Area, which may be adjusted for management.

External expertise can be called upon to assist the Scientific Council where appropriate. Where decisions of the Scientific Council cannot be reached by consensus, all views are reported to the General Council for continuing debate.




Figure 6 Convention on Future Multilateral Co-Operation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries

a Fisheries Commission, whose membership is determined by the General Council and is iii) composed of only those Contracting Parties which participate in the fisheries in the Regulatory Area, is responsible for the management and conservation of the fisheries resources in the Regulatory Area. Each Commission Member may appoint three representatives who may be accompanied to meetings by support staff. The Commission may establish Committees or Sub-committees to assist in the execution of its

duties and functions.

Each Commission member has one vote in proceedings and decisions are taken by majority providing a quorum of at least two-thirds of the Commission Members are present.

a Secretariat is maintained by the Contracting Parties to provide administrative services to the Organisation. The Chief Administrative Officer of the Secretariat is the Executive Secretary, appointed by the General Council, for the Organisation.

Each Contracting Party pays the costs associated with participating in meetings and contributes to an annual budget for the Organisation. This budget is in part calculated on the basis of the size each Contracting Party's fisheries in the Convention Area (Appendix 1).


#### 7. Convention on the Conservation of the Living Resources of the Southeast Atlantic (ICSEAF)


Established: 1971

Contracting Parties: USA, Panama, Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala

**Convention Area:** Southeast Atlantic

This Convention was established through a mutual interest among the Contracting Parties to cooperate in the rational exploitation and conservation of all living marine resources of the Southeast Atlantic. To assist this, the Contracting Parties formed the International Commission for the Southeast Atlantic Fisheries (ICSEAF) which meets at least once every two years. Not more than three Commissioners, accompanied by experts or advisers represent each Contracting Party on the Commission. Each Contracting Party has one vote.





To promote collaboration in areas of common interest and to avoid duplication the Commission has established working relationships with other appropriate international organisations which have related objectives.

In carrying out its responsibilities with respect to research on the biology, ecology and fisheries for the marine resources of the Convention Area, and the collection, publication and dissemination of information concerning these resources, the Commission utilises, as far as feasible, the technical and scientific services of the Contracting Parties. Other sources of information may also be utilised by the Commission.

The Executive Secretary of the Commission appoints staff who are responsible for the collection and analysis of data and information that will assist the Commission in the execution of its responsibilities. Contracting Parties are obliged to collaborate with the Commission in these activities.

The Commission has the mandate to establish a Regional Committee for each of the regions into which the Convention Area may be divided on an ecological basis, and a Stock Committee with respect to any stock that may

be found within the Convention Area. In addition, the Commission may also establish a Scientific Advisory Council and other such subsidiary bodies as are required for the effective management of fisheries within the Convention Area. Tools provided in the Convention for management include, regulation of fishing gears, seasonal, geographical and total quotas, and minimum sizes for target species.

The Convention is open for ratification by any Member of the United Nations or any specialised agency of the United Nations.

## 8. Eastern Pacific Ocean Tuna Fishing Agreement (IPOTFA)


**Established:** Drafted 1983 [not yet in force]

Contracting Parties: USA, Panama, Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala

Convention Area: Eastern Pacific Ocean

Another initiative for the management of tuna in the eastern Pacific has been taken by the United States and several nations in Central America. This treaty, the "Eastern Pacific Ocean Tuna Fishing Agreement" with the objective of providing for rational exploitation of the fishery resource and equitable access to the fishing areas is based on a scheme of granting licenses in the Convention Area.

Figure 8 Eastern Pacific Ocean Tuna Fishing Agreement (IPOTFA)



It is proposed that the treaty, executed by the Eastern Pacific Tuna Organisation, would be administered by a governing Council, without a permanent secretariat. There is provision within the Convention to appoint a Director and to provide resources for the support of limited staff. The Council would be composed of one representative from each Contracting Party which is a coastal State or is a member of IATTC.

The Agreement would establish mechanisms for issuing international licenses to vessels of Member states which would permit them to fish in the EEZ's of other Member countries. The abundance of tuna within the EEZ of a participating country and the historical association of that country with tuna fishing would be considered in allocating quotas for the harvest of tuna between countries. The target resources for this Agreement are the tunas of the genera <a href="Thunnus">Thunnus</a>, <a href="Sarda, Auxis, Euthunnus">Sarda, Auxis, Euthunnus</a> and <a href="Katsuwonus">Katsuwonus</a>.

When the Contracting Parties include all the States that fish for tuna in the eastern Pacific Ocean on a meaningful scale in relation to conservation requirements, and prior to the development of a comprehensive conservation

regime in which all States are expected to participate, the Council has the mandate to make interim conservation recommendations based on reports commissioned from experts or competent international agencies.

The treaty has only been signed by five of the fifteen nations that were involved in its negotiation over a ten year period. Only one of these nations has a high seas fleet. The treaty must be ratified by five nations before entering into force and this in unlikely to occur in the near future.

#### 9. Other initiatives

#### i) Eastern Pacific

In the last few years a number of Latin American states have drafted an additional treaty for the management of tuna in the eastern Pacific Ocean involving the establishment of the "Latin American Fisheries Development Organisation" called OLDEPESCA. This agreement would theoretically govern access to fishing grounds within the EEZ's of Member nations and on the high seas. The Members of this organisation include Mexico, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Peru, Costa Rica, Chile, Panama, Columbia, Guatemala, and El Salvador.

Management advice for this Organisation would be solicited from the best available sources. It has been reported that under this agreement, tuna quotas would be apportioned among the participating countries in proportion to the concentrations of tunas within their jurisdictions. If the coastal State does not have the capacity to harvest its share, licenses would be sold to other Members to harvest the surplus. Provisions are made in the treaty for Members to co-operate on political and economic sanctions against violators of the treaty.

It is not likely that this treaty will enter into force in the near future. The treaty requires five nations to sign and ratify the treaty for it to enter into force. To date, five nations have signed the treaty, but only four have ratified it.

#### ii) South Pacific

The responsibility for providing advice for management of South Pacific tuna resources is vested in two regional bodies, the South Pacific Commission (SPC), through the Tuna and Billfish Assessment Program (TBAP), and the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA).

In collaboration with member countries, the SPC provides scientific advice on the collection of catch statistics under bilateral and regional fisheries access arrangements. Based on the analysis of that data, the SPC provides scientific advice for management to its Member countries. The FFA is responsible for providing management advice consisting of economic, legal, biological and other considerations for regional and world tuna fisheries to member countries. It co-ordinates the effective use all available information in negotiations with foreign fishing paries interested in fishing in the region.

With respect to the provision of scientific advice and the integral role of all participants in the fisheries in the collection and analysis of appropriate data, SPC has established the Standing Committee on Tuna and Billfish (SCTB). This Committee, with SPC acting as the secretariat, provides a forum for scientists from distant water fishing nations to meet with fisheries officers from Member countries of SPC and staff of the TBAP to discuss the priorities of the work programme of the TBAP. Currently the main areas of interest for the TBAP are fisheries statistics, tuna oceanography, stock assessment and fisheries interactions. The high degree of co-operation that has been facilitated through the SCTB has resulted in an improved database available to TBAP staff for scientific assessment of the South Pacific region's tuna resources.

A similar degree of co-operation has also resulted in increased understanding of the status of the South Pacific albacore stocks and fisheries targeting them through an informal working group of scientists and representatives from Pacific Island countries with common interests in albacore biology and fisheries. The SPC also acts as the secretariat for the South Pacific Albacore Research Group (SPAR) which consists of scientists and fisheries officials from the South Pacific and elsewhere who have common interests in albacore. SPC donates its services as the secretariat for SPAR and the group have met twice in the last four years.

It was at the SPAR workshops that scientists first expressed concern at the rapidly increasing albacore catch by surface fisheries, in particular the component taken by driftnets. The workshops drew attention to the fact that catch data that would assist analysis of the status of the South Pacific albacore stock was lacking from the driftnet fishery and that this situation should be corrected by any means. At the First Consultation on a Regime for South Pacific Albacore Fisheries Management, the continuing important role of SPAR as the scientific advisory body in the development of guidelines for the management of South Pacific albacore fisheries was endorsed.

The operation of SPC and FFA with respect to providing assistance to the South Pacific region in the development and management of tuna fisheries has been effective with respect to the provision of information to assist the decision making process at the national and regional level. This effectiveness has resulted from a high degree of cooperation between the two organisations extending, where their respective mandates permit, to the sharing of fisheries data concerning the operation of tuna fishing fleets in the region.

It is likely that these two regional fisheries organisations will continue to provide a significant level of advisory support on matters concerning tuna to their member countries for a considerable time to come. Available financial and human resources of island countries in the Pacific currently constrain the amount of intelligence relating to tuna fisheries and markets that can be gathered at a national level. At present accurate information is available to all members of these organisatons at a cost that is considerably less than would be the case if those nations operated systems for individually acquiring the same information.

#### BACKGROUND REFERENCES

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Solomon Islands, 18-27 September, 1989. FFA17/TM3/3.17. 15p.

Joseph, J. and J.W. Greenough. 1979. International Management of Tuna, Porpoise and Billfish: Biological, Legal and Political Aspects. University of Washington Press. 253 p.

Appendix I. Formulae used by regional fisheries bodies for assessing national contributions.

Organisation	Formulae for apportioning	Actual share			
IATTC	The proportion of joint expenses paid by each Member is related to the proportion of the total catch from the fisheries covered by the Convention utilised by that Member.	Contributions paid for the year ended 30 September, 1986:			
		Member	US\$	%	
		France Japan Nicaragua Panama USA	33,979 84,429 1,000 2,648,000	1.2 3.1 0.0 0.4 95.7	
		TOTAL	2,767,408	100.0	
ICCAT	Each Contracting party shall contribute annually to the budget of the Commission an amount equal to:	Member	US\$	%	
	a) US\$1,000 for Commission membership	Angola Benin	14,547 3,960	2.5 0.7	
	b) US\$1,000 for each Panel membership	Brazil Canada	26,403 16,247	4.6 2.8	
	c) If the proposed budget for joint expenses for any biennium should exceed the whole amount of contributions under a) and b), one-third of the amount of these expenses shall be contributed by the Contracting Parties in	Cape Verde Cuba Equatorial	9,381 17,713	1.6 3.1	
	proportion to their contributions under a) and b). For the remaining two thirds the Commission shall determine on the basis of the latest available	Guinea France	64,088	11.1	

information:	Gabon	7,831	1.4	
i) the total round weight of the catch of tuna and tuna-like	Ghana Cote	36,578	6.4	
fishes and the net weight of canned products of such fishes for each	d'Ivoire	19,359	3.4	
Contracting Party;	Japan	39,633	6.9	
	Korea	26,234	4.6	
ii) the total of i) for all the Contracting Parties. Each	Morocco	14,901	2.6	
Contracting Party contributes its share of the remaining two-thirds in the same	Portugal	22,439	3.9	
ratio that its total in i) bears to the total in ii). That part of the budget referred to in this section is set by agreement of Contracting Parties present at voting.	Sao Tome & Principe	4,064	0.7	
	Senegal	12,618	2.2	
	S. Africa	9,674	1.7	
	Spain	118,757	20.7	
	Uruguay	5,805	1.0	
	USA	46,218	8.0	
	USSR	19,877	3.5	
	Venezuela	38,673	6.7	
The contribution of each Member is equal in accordance with the recommendation of the Commission.	TOTAL	575,000	100.0	
recommendation of the Commission.	TOTAL	373,000	100.0	
	The contribution US\$102,456	for each	Member in 198	87 was
The General Council establishes the contribution due for each Contracting Party under the annual budget on the following basis:	Member	US\$	%	
10 (64 1 1 (2 12 1 1 4 2 12 1 1	Bulgaria	11,257	2.5	
a) 10 percent of the budget is divided among the coastal States	Canada	237,652	52.8	
in proportion to their nominal catches in the Convention Area in the year	Cuba	15,580	3.5	
ending two years before the beginning of the budget year;	Denmark	31,704	7.0	

INPFC

NAFO

	EC	43,079	9.6
b) 30 percent of the budget shall be divided equally among all	Germany	14,067	3.1
Contracting Parties, and	Iceland	11,257	2.5
	Japan	13,283	2.9
c) 60 percent of the budget shall be divided among all	Norway	11,663	2.6
Contracting Parties in proportion to their nominal catches in the Convention	Poland	13,121	2.9
Area in the year ending two years before the beginning of the budget year.	Romania	11,257	2.5
	USSR	37,086	8.2
	TOTAL	451,006	100.0

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The financial assets consist of initial contributions and annual dues from its Members and all property and rights that it may acquire either by purchase or by gift. The contribution of its Members is in accordance with the scheme of Latin American Economic System as determined by the Conference of Ministers and may be changed in accordance with its needs. In 1985 the following formula was adopted:

		US\$
Group 1	Argentina, Brazil, Mexico	66,055
Group 2	Colombia, Cuba, Chile Peru, Venezuela	35,867
Group 3	Bolivia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Panama, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay, Dominican Republic, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago	6,163
Group 4	Barbados, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti	2,035

Not Available